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79 
REAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE NCAA CAN 
NO LONGER EVADE ANTITRUST LIABILITY 
THROUGH AMATEURISM AFTER 
O’BANNON v. NCAA 
Abstract: On August 8, 2014, in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic As-
sociation, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held that 
the NCAA’s restriction on compensating student-athletes for the use of their 
names, images, and likenesses violated the Sherman Act. The court ruled against 
the NCAA despite a long history of judicial deference grounded in preserving 
the amateur and educational nature of the NCAA. The NCAA has appealed the 
decision. Despite annual revenues approaching $1 billion, the NCAA claims its 
amateur and educational fundamentals distinguish its product from commercial-
ized professional sports. This Comment argues that the O’Bannon decision must 
be upheld because it correctly identified the contradiction of the NCAA’s ama-
teurism antitrust defense. 
INTRODUCTION 
For many years the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
has relied on its principle of amateurism to shield it from antitrust liability.1 
Courts have historically allowed the NCAA to impose restrictions to preserve 
its amateurism ideals that differentiate its product from professional sports.2 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (asserting that the NCAA’s 
eligibility rules in question are not subject to antitrust analysis because they are designed to pre-
serve amateurism); Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., Inc v. NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 998, at 
*3–4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974) (finding that the NCAA’s newly enacted rule was not anticompeti-
tive because its purpose was to uphold the academic standards and amateur status of student-
athletes). Recently, however, the NCAA’s rules that forbid college athletes from controlling the 
commercial rights to their names and likeness were determined to “unreasonably restrain trade in 
the market for certain education and athletic opportunities offered by the NCAA Division I 
schools.” See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Marc Edelman, The 
District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step 
Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 2319, 2320–21 (2014). Controlling the commercial use of one’s name, image, and likeness is 
referred to as “publicity rights.” See Stacy L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Pub-
licity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2006). 
 2 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984) (“The identification of this 
‘product’ with an academic tradition differentiates college football . . . . Thus, the NCAA plays a 
vital role in enabling college football to preserve its character . . . .”); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 
F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 1988) (agreeing with Board of Regents that eligibility rules allow the 
NCAA product to survive in the face of commercializing pressures); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. 
Supp. 295, 304 (D. Mass. 1975) (granting deference to NCAA’s eligibility rules to preserve edu-
cation and amateurism as essential aspects of intercollegiate athletics). 
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Most notably, the NCAA has been able to use amateurism as a means to limit 
student athlete compensation without antitrust ramifications.3 In 2014, in 
O’Bannon v. NCAA, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia held that prohibiting compensation for the use of student-athletes’ 
names, images, and likenesses in Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) football 
and Division I men’s basketball violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 This 
ruling extinguished the long-standing practice of judicial deference towards 
the NCAA’s amateurism principle.5   
This Comment argues that the O’Bannon decision must be upheld be-
cause it exposes how the NCAA utilizes its amateurism principle to restrain 
trade and internalize profitability.6 Part I of this Comment details the proce-
dural and factual history of O’Bannon.7 Part II examines the O’Bannon 
court’s rule of reason antitrust analysis and the judicial shift away from blind 
deference to the NCAA under the Sherman Act.8 Finally, Part III argues the 
O’Bannon decision must be upheld because the NCAA uses student-athletes’ 
names, images, and likenesses for commercial gain, not to endorse amateur-
ism.9 
I. O’BANNON V. NCAA AND THE NCAA’S RULES ON AMATEURISM 
The NCAA does not compensate student-athletes for the use of their 
names, images, and likenesses pursuant to the NCAA’s principle of amateur-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Drew N. Goodwin, Not Quite Filling the Gap: Why the Miscellaneous Expense Allow-
ance Leaves the NCAA Vulnerable to Antitrust Litigation, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1277, 1298 (2013). 
 4 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007; see The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act declares any contract or conspiracy that restrains trade or commerce among the several 
States or internationally to be illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Division I football is divided into two subdi-
visions: the Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) and the Football Championship Subdivision 
(“FCS”). O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 964. FBS Schools are permitted a larger number of scholar-
ships compared to FCS schools, thus the FBS generally has a higher caliber of football competi-
tion resulting in larger revenues. See id. See generally Chris Smith, College Football’s Opening 
Weekend Blowouts Are Wins for Both Teams Involved, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/08/26/college-footballs-opening-weekend-blowouts-
are-wins-for-both-teams-involved/, archived at https://perma.cc/HUX7-FPSP?type=image (de-
scribing one-sided victories for FBS teams paying large sums to play FCS programs). 
 5 See, e.g., McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344–45 (ruling in favor of the NCAA’s eligibility re-
quirements as a means to preserve amateurism); Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., 1974 WL 998, at 
*3–4 (granting deference to the NCAA even though its rule effectively put the plaintiff out of 
business). 
 6 See infra notes 63–80 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 10–17 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 18–62 and accompanying text. 
 9 See Marc Edelman, The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the 
Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of 
College Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1030 (2014) (describing the NCAA’s paradoxical goal of 
maximizing revenues while preventing commercial exploitation); infra notes 63–80 and accompa-
nying text (arguing that the commercial realities of the NCAA justify the O’Bannon ruling). 
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ism.10 Each year, student-athletes must sign a version of Form 08-3a titled 
“Student-Athlete Statement” to be eligible for participation in intercollegiate 
sports.11 Part IV of Form 08-3a permitted the NCAA (or a party acting on its 
behalf) to use the name or image of student-athletes to generally promote 
NCAA championships, events, or programs.12 A student-athlete that receives 
any form of compensation is immediately rendered ineligible to participate in 
his or her particular sport.13  
On July 21, 2009, Ed O’Bannon and twenty current and former Division 
I student-athletes filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the NCAA is in vio-
lation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.14 These alleged violations stemmed 
from the NCAA rules prohibiting men’s Division I football and basketball 
players from receiving a share of the revenues earned from the use of their 
names, images, and likenesses.15 On August 8, 2014, the U.S. District Court 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art 2.9, at 4 (2014) [hereinafter NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/X9N4-F2Y4. The NCAA defines its principle of amateurism as fol-
lows: “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should 
be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental, and social benefits to be derived. 
Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be 
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.” Id.; see also Erin Cronk, 
Note, Unlawful Encroachment: Why the NCAA Must Compensate Student-Athletes for the Use of 
Their Names, Images, and Likeness, 34 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2013) (explaining 
NCAA amateurism policies). 
 11 See Class Action Complaint at 21, O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 21, 2009) 
(No. CV-09-3329) [hereinafter O’Bannon 2009 Complaint]. The form title changes annually with 
the applicable academic year. See, e.g., NCAA Form 08-3a Academic Year 2008–09 at 4, UNIV. 
OF KENTUCKY, http://www.ukathletics.com/doc_lib/compliance0809_sa_statement.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/P8GH-XWL6 [hereinafter Kentucky Form 08-3a]; NCAA Form 14-3a Academ-
ic Year 2014–15, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI%20Form%2014-3a%20-%20
Student-Athlete%20Statement_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6JGV-MUWS [hereinafter NCAA 
Form 14-3a]. 
 12 Compare Kentucky Form 08-3a, supra note 11 (containing language of Section IV), with 
NCAA Form 14-3a, supra note 11 (removing the language of section VI). The same language 
however can be found in the NCAA bylaw 12.5.1.1.1. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra 
note 10, art 12.5.1.1.1, at 68. 
 13 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 10, art 12.1.2, at 59. An individual is deemed inel-
igible to play upon using “his or her athletic skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that 
sport.” Id. 
 14 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 962; O’Bannon 2009 Complaint, supra note 11, at 2; see 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (declaring it illegal to conspire to restrain trade or commerce). To state a claim 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires: (1) that there was a contract, combination, or con-
spiracy, (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under either a per se rule of illegality 
or a rule of reason analysis, and (3) that the restraint affected interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1; 
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 15 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955. The plaintiffs consolidated with another class action in 
January 2010, and asserted claims relating to their publicity rights against Electronic Arts (EA) 
and Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC). See Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 
3, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. C 09–1967 CW (N.D. 
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for the Northern District of California granted an injunction preventing the 
NCAA from forbidding student-athlete compensation based on revenues gen-
erated from the names, images, and likenesses of the players.16 The NCAA 
has appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.17 
II. THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE NCAA’S AMATEURISM DEFENSE 
The Sherman Act’s broad parameters once exploited by the NCAA to 
evade antitrust liability now serve to expose its contradicting amateurism pol-
icies.18 Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of the Sherman Act 
and examines the jurisprudential shift away from deference to the NCAA’s 
amateurism principle.19 Specifically, Section A explains the per se and rule of 
reason violations of the Sherman Act in the context of the NCAA.20 Section B 
examines the 2014 U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia’s rule of reason analysis in O’Bannon v. NCAA.21 Finally, Section C high-
lights U.S. Supreme Court dicta relied upon by the NCAA in its amateurism 
defense.22 
A. Overview of the Sherman Act 
 The Sherman Act functions as a policing tool against market manipu-
lation that unreasonably restrains trade and competition.23 Given that the 
Sherman Act is analyzed as a common law statute,24 what constitutes a “re-
straint on trade” evolves with the dynamics of present economic conditions.25 
                                                                                                                           
Cal. 2010) [hereinafter Consolidated Complaint]. The parties subsequently agreed to settle these 
claims against EA and CLC. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 965. 
 16 See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007–08; Permanent Injunction at 1, O’Bannon, 7 F. 
Supp. 3d 955 (No. C 09-3329 CW) [hereinafter O’Bannon NCAA Injunction]. 
 17 Notice of Appeal at 1, O’Bannon, No. 09-CV-3329-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014). 
 18 See infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 23–62 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 23–34 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 35–53 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text. 
 23 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”); see also Spectrum 
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (stating that the Sherman Act protects the 
public from market failures and conduct that unfairly destroys competition). 
 24 Christine A. Burns, Potential Game Changers Only Have Eligibility Left to Suit Up for a 
Different Kind of Court: Former Student-Athletes Bring Class Action Antitrust Lawsuit Against 
the NCAA, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 391, 402 (2011) (“The Sherman Act is treated as a common law 
statute.”). As a common law statute, the Sherman Act provides a broad mandate, which courts 
shape and apply to the facts of each case. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679, 688 (1978). 
 25 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (reasoning 
that it is impractical to create a single framework of what constitutes a “restraint on trade” because 
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Therefore, courts must determine on a case-by-cases basis whether a restraint 
on trade is “unreasonable” to the point of illegality.26  
An agreement between parties can unreasonably restrain trade under ei-
ther a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis.27 An agreement is 
per se illegal when it is plainly harmful to competition with no significant 
benefits that it does not warrant the time and expense to analyze its effects.28 
Given that some trade restraints are necessary in order for the NCAA to main-
tain fair and balanced intercollegiate athletics, the restraint against compensa-
tion for student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses must be analyzed un-
der the more flexible rule of reason analysis. 29 
Under a rule of reason analysis, a court will find liability when a re-
straint’s harm to competition outweighs its procompetitive effects.30 Some 
circuits evaluate the rule of reason through a three-step analysis to determine 
Section 1 violations of the Sherman Act.31 First, the plaintiff must illustrate 
adverse effects on competition in a relevant market caused by the defend-
ant.32 If the plaintiff meets this initial step in the analysis, then the burden 
shifts to the defendant to assert procompetitive justifications for its action.33 If 
the defendant succeeds in the second step, then the burden shifts back to the 
                                                                                                                           
the circumstances of each case must be considered); see Burns, supra note 24, at 402–03 (explain-
ing how the Sherman Act adapts to the current economic landscape). 
 26 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (discussing how all Sherman Act analyses implement a case-by-
case common law approach). 
 27 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 691–92 (describing the “two complementary 
categories of antitrust analysis”). 
 28 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (explaining the legal framework 
of the Sherman Act). Agreements not challenged as per se illegal are analyzed under the rule of 
reason framework. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986) (reasoning 
that the restraint must be analyzed under the rule of reason because per se analysis is inappropri-
ate). 
 29 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 (acknowledging that the NCAA must be given some 
leeway to adopt anticompetitive restraints because horizontal restraints on competition are essen-
tial to maintain intercollegiate athletics); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal 
2014). When economic impact is not immediately obvious, the U.S. Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to adopt per se rules of analysis. See id. (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 552 U.S. 3, 10 
(1997)). 
 30 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985. 
 31 See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (explaining that 
“[u]nder this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a 
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition”); 
Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); 
K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995); Bhan v. 
NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). 
 32 Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 959; K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 127. 
 33 K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 127. 
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plaintiff to provide less restrictive alternatives to achieve the same procom-
petitive effects.34   
B. O’Bannon v. NCAA’s Application of the Rule of Reason Analysis 
The O’Bannon plaintiffs’ successful Sherman Act claim asserted that the 
NCAA restrained trade in the national college education market.35 The 
NCAA conceded that the rules prohibiting compensation for student-athletes’ 
names, images, and likenesses were enacted pursuant to an agreement among 
its member schools.36 Nor did the NCAA contest that the rules affect inter-
state commerce.37 Accordingly, the court only analyzed whether the re-
strictions unreasonably restrained trade under the three-part rule of reason 
analysis.38 
1. Adverse Effects in Relevant Market 
The plaintiffs illustrated the effect of the NCAA’s unlawful restraint on 
the national market where schools recruit athletes to participate in FBS foot-
ball or Division I men’s basketball while receiving a higher education.39 FBS 
football and Division I men’s basketball leagues experience unmatched re-
cruitment opportunities due to scholarship availability and the overall league 
competition.40 For this reason, the opportunities offered by these schools op-
erate as a distinct market in the college recruitment process.41 When acting in 
harmony with the NCAA, these select schools utilize their position to fix the 
price of recruits’ publicity rights.42 The court concluded that not offering re-
cruits a share of licensing revenues eliminates a form of price competition, 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See id. The plaintiff need not address less restrictive alternatives if the defendant fails to 
meet its obligation under the rule of reason burden-shifting analysis. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 
1005 (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1913b (3d ed. 
2006)). 
 35 See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 965, 1007. 
 36 Id. at 985. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See id.; supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of reason three-part 
test). 
 39 See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 986. 
 40 See id. at 965–66; Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (conclud-
ing that lower-tier Division I football schools cannot offer the same level of benefits in coaching, 
facilities, and publicity as top-tier Division I football programs). 
 41 See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 987; Cronk, supra note 10, at 146–48 (describing lucrative 
broadcasting deals with national outlets involving FBS football and Division I men’s basketball). 
 42 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 988. Any school attempting to offer a recruit compensation for 
the use of his name, image, and likeness would be subject to sanctions by the NCAA. Id. Student-
athletes are forbidden to receive financial aid based on athletic ability that is greater than a full 
“grant-in-aid,” which covers tuition and fees, room and board, and course-related materials. Id. at 
971. 
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and creates higher prices than would exist if schools competed over such ben-
efits.43 
2. NCAA’s Procompetitive Justifications for Restraint 
In response to the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for its re-
striction on student-athlete compensation,44 the court held that the restrictions 
played a limited role in driving the consumer demand for the NCAA’s prod-
uct45 and facilitating integration of academics and athletics.46 Accordingly, 
the court rejected the NCAA’s claims that restricting players’ access to licens-
ing revenues maintains a competitive balance among FBS football and Divi-
sion I basketball teams47 and increases the total output of its product.48 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See id. at 987. The court allowed the same evidence used to support the plaintiffs’ monopo-
ly theory to support an alternative monopsony (agreement to fix prices among buyers) theory, 
which it held to be a sufficient restraint of trade in the market for recruits’ athletic services. See id. 
at 991. 
 44 See id. at 999–1004. 
 45 Id. at 1001, 1003. The NCAA asserted that not compensating student-athletes maintains its 
amateur tradition, which contributes to the popularity of college sports compared to professional 
sports. Id. at 999. The court found that public opinion was dependent on the level of compensation 
student-athletes would receive. Id. at 1000–01. The court concluded that although the NCAA’s 
amateurism principle might justify restricting large payments to student-athletes, it does not justify 
an overall ban on compensation for student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses. See id. at 
1001. 
 46 See id. at 1003. The NCAA had university administrators testify that paying student-
athletes large sums of money would create a wedge between student-athletes and the rest of the 
academic community. Id. at 980. 
 47 See id. at 1001. The NCAA’s economic expert failed to produce any evidence illustrating 
that the NCAA’s restrictions on student-athlete compensation promotes competitive balance. See 
id. The court otherwise noted that revenues from FBS football and Division I basketball have 
grown exponentially creating an “arms race” that rewards schools with already large athletic 
budgets. See id. at 1002. 
 48 See id. at 1004. The NCAA claimed the ban on compensation increases output by attracting 
schools philosophically committed to amateurism, and enabling schools who could not otherwise 
afford to compete in Division I to do so. Id. The court noted that some major Division I confer-
ences have conversely sought greater autonomy from the NCAA to enact their own rules, which 
may result in more student aid. Id. See generally Eben Novy-Williams, NCAA’s Richest Get Au-
tonomy, Paving Way for More Aid to Athletes, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2014), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-07/ncaa-s-richest-get-autonomy-paving-way-for-more-aid-
to-athletes.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2GS9-E6QW (discussing that the NCAA restructur-
ing might give athletes at the richest schools a piece of the billion-dollar industry). The court also 
reasoned that schools have the option of whether or not to re-allocate their athletic budget. 
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1004. 
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3. Less Restrictive Alternatives  
 The plaintiffs effectively established less restrictive alternatives to the 
same benefits sought by the NCAA, and therefore the court held that the 
NCAA unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act.49 
The first alternative proposed by the plaintiffs would allow schools to 
reward stipends to student-athletes as long as they do not exceed the cost of 
attendance.50 Next, the plaintiffs proposed that schools hold payments in a 
trust for student athletes.51 Both alternatives would derive from revenues gen-
erated from athletes’ names, images, and likenesses, and the trust would be 
distributed after graduation or when eligibility expired.52 Ultimately, the court 
granted an injunction to prevent the NCAA from prohibiting FBS football or 
Division I basketball schools from offering recruits a limited share of the rev-
enues generated from student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.53  
 C. U.S. Supreme Court Dicta and the NCAA’s Amateurism Defense 
The NCAA’s amateurism defense in O’Bannon relied heavily on U.S. 
Supreme Court dicta to endorse its restraints as necessary to maintain a 
unique intercollegiate product.54 In 1984, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta that 
the NCAA must be given leeway to adopt anti-competitive rules in order to 
maintain its unique product.55 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007–08. The court found that each 
alternative discredited the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 
982–84. The NCAA’s justifications based on consumer demand and integration with academics 
were grounded in the fear of overly-lucrative compensation for student-athletes. See id. at 980, 
1000. The NCAA’s principle of amateurism would be maintained because the student-athletes’ 
deferred payment vests after eligibility expires and the stipend payments only cover cost of at-
tendance. See id. at 982–84. The NCAA’s own expert witness testified that his general concerns 
about paying student-athletes would be partially assuaged if the payments were held in a trust, and 
he would not be troubled if schools were allowed to make $5,000 payments. Id. at 983. 
 50 See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982. The NCAA’s member schools provided student-
athletes with similar stipends before the NCAA lowered its cap on grant-in-aid. Id. at 983. 
 51 Id.at 983 ; Consolidated Complaint, supra note 15, at 4. 
 52 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983; Consolidated Complaint, supra note 15, at 4. 
 53 O’Bannon NCAA Injunction, supra note 16, at 1–2. Consistent with the plaintiffs’ pro-
posal, the injunction sets a $5,000 minimum for the deferred compensation granted through a trust 
fund payable on the student-athlete’s graduation or expiration of eligibility. Id. The injunction also 
precludes the NCAA from prohibiting additional stipends for athletes’ publicity rights up to the 
full cost of attendance in addition to a grant-in-aid financial aid package. Id. at 2. 
 54 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02 (stating that in order to preserve the NCAA’s 
“product,” athletes should be required to attend class and must not be paid); In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation, 990 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting the 
amateurism defense arguments made by the NCAA on its motion to dismiss in O’Bannon). 
 55 See 468 U.S. at 101–02. This case involved a Sherman Act claim surrounding the NCAA’s 
plan to limit the number of college football games televised. Id. at 85. The Court noted the NCAA 
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Prior to O’Bannon, the U.S. Supreme Court’s dicta in Board of Regents 
solidified a policy of judicial deference that the NCAA relied on to evade an-
titrust liability.56 Both before and after Board of Regents, courts generally 
allowed the NCAA to impose restraints that maintained its amateurism fun-
damentals.57 Some courts even held that NCAA eligibility rules were not sub-
ject to antitrust scrutiny at all.58 
The O’Bannon court construed the dicta in Board of Regents narrowly, 
reasoning that a ban on compensation was not the focus of the case, and 
therefore the U.S. Supreme Court never analyzed whether it had any procom-
petitive effects.59 The O’Bannon court’s narrowing of the Board of Regents 
dicta aligns with the decisions of a handful of courts beginning to shift away 
from deference to the NCAA amateurism model.60 Although the NCAA has 
continued to maintain that its restraints are necessary in order to preserve the 
                                                                                                                           
sought to market a “particular brand” that is tied to “an academic tradition” and amateurism. See 
id. 
 56 See Lindsay J. Rosenthal, Comment, From Regulating Organization to Multi-Billion Dol-
lar Business: The NCAA Is Commercializing the Amateur Competition It Has Taken Almost a 
Century to Create, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 321, 330 (2003) (discussing how few have suc-
ceeded against the NCAA in antitrust litigation); infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing cases that granted deference to the NCAA). 
 57 See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 1988) (relying on 
Board of Regents in holding that a ban on compensation is necessary for the NCAA product to 
survive in the face of commercializing pressures); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. 
Mass. 1975) (holding that the eligibility rule was designed to uphold the amateurism model of the 
NCAA, and thus is valid); Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 
998, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974) (holding that the NCAA is structured to promote amateurism 
and education, and any effect it may have on third parties is “at best indirect”). 
 58 See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744–45 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (concluding that eligi-
bility rules designed to preserve amateurism are not subject to antitrust liability); Jones, 392 F. 
Supp. at 303 (“A threshold question is whether the Sherman Act reaches the actions of the NCAA 
members in setting eligibility standards . . . . On the basis of the existing record, this court con-
cludes that it does not.”). But see Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) (stating 
that NCAA rulemaking that is accompanied by a discernable economic purpose should be subject 
to antitrust scrutiny). 
 59 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (discuss-
ing the Supreme Court’s dicta on the motion to dismiss in O’Bannon). 
 60 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02; O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999; White v. NCAA, 
No. CV 06-999, 2006 WL 8066802, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006) (denying NCAA’s motion to 
dismiss a class action claim regarding the limits placed on athletic financial aid); In re NCAA I-A 
Walk-On Football Players Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1146–47 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (alleg-
ing that the NCAA’s restriction on the number of football scholarships granted prevented the 
plaintiffs from receiving financial aid). This shift has resulted in courts beginning to recognize 
specific restrained markets for student-athletes. See White, 2006 WL 8066802, at *2; In re NCAA 
I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. In these cases, the plaintiffs 
sufficiently alleged a relevant market of NCAA member schools that compete for skilled prospec-
tive athletes. See White, 2006 WL 8066802, at *3; In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players 
Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 
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amateur product of intercollegiate sports,61 this shift away from judicial def-
erence may persist as the NCAA continues to face allegations of antitrust vio-
lations for its financial aid restraints.62 
III. NCAA’S MODERN ECONOMICS REFLECTED IN O’BANNON HOLDING 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should up-
hold the 2014 decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California in O’Bannon v. NCAA because it reflects the current economic 
landscape of the NCAA.63 For one, the distinction between amateur- and 
commerce-driven NCAA bylaws has diminished.64  The NCAA has longed 
enjoyed limited antitrust liability when enacting rules to protect amateurism 
because such rules have primarily “noncommercial objectives.”65 Recruiting 
elite high school athletes has become a commercial investment with the pos-
sibility of generating millions of dollars for schools.66 The NCAA manipu-
lates its amateurism model to deprive student-athletes of their publicity rights 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-JMS-MJD, 2011 WL 3878200, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 
2011), aff’d, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012) (hearing an NCAA argument that one year scholarship 
rules take “potential abuse” out of recruiting, which promotes amateurism); In re NCAA I-A Walk-
On Football Players Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. The NCAA attempted to characterize In 
re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation as a challenge to its protection of amateurism 
in “big-time college football.” See 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. 
 62 See Consolidated Amended Complaint at 4, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Anti-
trust Litigation, No. 4:14-md-2541-CW (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014). In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-
Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation is a consolidation of Sherman Act antitrust claims alleging the NCAA 
and its major conferences have unlawfully capped grant-in-aid below the full cost of attending 
school. Id. at 1. The NCAA has moved to dismiss the case, and claims that the restrictions help 
maintain the collegiate amateurism model. See Notice of Motion to Dismiss at 10, In re NCAA 
Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 14-cv-02758-CW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014). 
 63 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (describing the college 
recruiting process that has been referred to an “arms race”); see Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (holding that the Sherman Act’s prohibitions on 
restraining trade “evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions”); see also Edel-
man, supra note 9, at 1031 (“Today, the total value of the college sports enterprise is estimated at 
more than $11 billion.”). 
 64 See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he transactions between 
NCAA schools and student-athletes are, to some degree, commercial in nature, and therefore take 
place in a relevant market with respect to the Sherman Act.”). The modern definition of commerce 
is “almost every activity from which [an] actor anticipates economic gain.” See id. at 340 (quoting 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 250). 
 65 See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743–44 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (quoting McCormack 
v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 
(D. Ariz. 1983) (identifying the two distinct rule making activities of the NCAA—rules concerned 
with protecting amateurism and rules with a discernable economic purpose). 
 66 See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340 (“No knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-
time college football programs competing for highly sought after high school football players do 
not anticipate economic gain from a successful recruiting program.”). 
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and to assume all benefits resulting from their skills and effort.67 Although the 
NCAA maintains its position as regulator of an amateur organization, in fact 
it utilizes student-athletes to sell a very lucrative product.68  
 Further, using amateurism as a means to ban compensation for the use 
of players’ names, images, and likenesses is a denial of the modern commer-
cial realities of the NCAA.69 From 2012 to 2013, the NCAA realized total 
revenue of $912 million.70 This vast revenue is largely due to the NCAA’s 
lucrative broadcasting deals driven by the hard work and success of student-
athletes.71 The NCAA claims its amateurism principle protects student-
athletes from commercial exploitation, however revenues reported at the 
University of Alabama alone are greater than the annual revenues of twenty-
five professional NBA teams and all thirty NHL teams.72 As the NCAA con-
tinues to maintain its fundamentals of amateurism in the face of such lucra-
tive “commercializing pressures,” student-athletes deserve a marginal slice of 
the revenues they effectively create.73  
Finally, the alternatives suggested by the O’Bannon plaintiffs expose 
how amateurism is an invalid excuse to the unlawful restraints enacted by the 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Leslie E. Wong, Comment, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon Takes 
on the NCAA for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1069, 1094 (2010) (describing how the NCAA maintains perpetual control of licensing play-
ers’ images to “protect” student athletes from commercial exploitation). 
 68 See NCAA v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (D. Nev. 1992) (stating that while the ath-
letes may be amateurs, intercollegiate athletics is clearly a big business); Rosenthal, supra note 56, 
at 335–36 (“At the same time the NCAA exposes itself to the market commerce, it is trying to 
maintain its status as an amateur sports organization . . . .”). 
 69 See Cronk, supra note 10, at 137–38 (describing how the NCAA fails to acknowledge the 
changing commercialization of intercollegiate athletics); Wong, supra note 67, at 1086–87 (dis-
cussing commercial gains by the NCAA and schools that are driven by the student-athletes). 
 70 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND SUBSIDIARIES, CONSOLIDATED 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT 2012–13, at 4, available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/NCAA_
FS_2012-13_V1%20DOC1006715.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E439-8EBC. 
 71 See Wong, supra note 67, at 1086 (describing how student-athletes drive the success of the 
NCAA’s profitable broadcasts). The NCAA currently has a fourteen-year, $10.8 billion multime-
dia deal for NCAA basketball with Turner Broadcasting and CBS Sports. Cronk, supra note 10, at 
146–47. This contract is solely for the Men’s Division I “March Madness” Basketball Tourna-
ment, which lasts for three weeks. Id. From 2008 to 2013, broadcaster ESPN spent $10 billion for 
NCAA television rights. James Miller & Richard Sandomir, College Football’s Most Dominant 
Player? ESPN, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/
25/sports/ncaafootball/college-footballs-most-dominant-player-its-espn.html, archived at https://
perma.cc/2ZHM-NCBM?type=pdf. 
 72 Edelman, supra note 9, at 1031 (describing commercial success of NCAA); see NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 10, art 2.9, at 4 (2014) (asserting that the principle of amateurism 
protects students from commercial exploitation). 
 73 See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344–45; Cronk, supra note 10, at 146 (explaining how the 
current NCAA television deals illustrate the profitability of student-athletes’ names, images, and 
likenesses in promoting NCAA events). 
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NCAA.74 Compensating student-athletes up to the cost of attendance or after 
eligibility expires maintains the same amateur principles that existed before 
O’Bannon.75 The NCAA still has the power to set a cap on payments derived 
from licensing revenues, which prevents student-athletes from receiving large 
salaries.76 Schools competing with limited revenue compensation will result 
in recruits having the best possible options to pursue higher education.77 This 
will only bolster the “vital part of the educational system,” namely that athlet-
ic programs play within the NCAA’s fundamental policies.78 
 The Ninth Circuit should uphold the O’Bannon district court decision 
and thus acknowledge the present economic realities of the NCAA.79 Moreo-
ver, other courts should follow the example of O’Bannon’s analysis of the 
legal merits and economic implications of the NCAA’s amateurism policies, 
and continue the trend away from blind deference to the NCAA.80 
CONCLUSION 
The NCAA should no longer be permitted to use its concept of amateur-
ism to internalize its growing profitability. In 2014, in O’Bannon v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California correctly held that the NCAA’s refusal to compensate stu-
dent-athletes for their publicity rights unlawfully restrains the college educa-
tion market. In so holding, the district court concluded that the NCAA’s re-
striction on compensating student-athletes for the use of their names, images, 
and likenesses violated the Sherman Act. The stipend and trust payment al-
ternatives proposed by the plaintiffs in O’Bannon illustrate that amateurism 
can co-exist with additional student-athlete benefits. More importantly, the 
O’Bannon decision recognized the inherent contradiction between the 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982–84 (explaining how the plaintiffs’ alternatives provide 
a less restrictive means of achieving the NCAA’s goals); supra notes 49–52 and accompanying 
text (describing plaintiffs’ less restrictive alternatives); see also Sam Cooper, Judge Rules Against 
NCAA in Ed O’Bannon Case, YAHOO, (Aug. 8, 2014, 7:53 PM), https://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/
ncaaf-dr-saturday/judge-rules-against-ncaa-in-ed-o-bannon-case-235317575.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/W532-XJAV?type=pdf (“[The court] noted that the NCAA’s key goals could be still 
accomplished without restrictive economic measures.”). 
 75 See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982–83. 
 76 See id. at 980, 1007 (noting that the NCAA asserted that compensating players could result 
in student-athletes being paid more than their professors). 
 77 Id. at 991–92 (“In the absence of this restraint, schools would compete against one another 
offering to pay more for the best recruits’ athletic services and . . . they would engage in price 
competition.”). 
 78 See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 10, art 1.3.1, at 1 (2014) (“[A]thletics pro-
grams of member institutions are designed to be a vital part of the educational system.”). 
 79 See supra notes 63–78 and accompanying text. 
 80 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
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NCAA’s amateurism principle and the billions of dollars profited off student-
athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.  
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